Overview

The deliberate releases of anthrax in the United States in October 2001 increase national awareness and concern about the threat of bioterrorism and highlighted the importance of including state and local public health departments in homeland security plans and strategies. The NGA Center, in partnership with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, has worked with the states to raise awareness among governors of the threat of bioterrorism; to identify state priorities for enhancing public health preparedness; and to encourage regional approaches through which states can work collaboratively to share resources and expertise before, during and after a public health emergency.

The NGA Center assists governors and their staff by:

• Providing technical assistance and consultation to states as they design and implement new programs and policies to prevent, prepare for and respond to public health threats;
• Synthesizing and disseminating information on state best practices in the area of public health preparedness;
• Sponsoring workshops, conference calls, and policy forums for governors' homeland security advisors, state health officials, emergency managers and others to discuss challenges, obstacles, and effective solutions;
• Supporting the development of regional strategies for bioterrorism prevention, preparedness and response; and
• Encouraging the integration of public health into homeland security plans and strategies.

Focus of Center Activities
In 2005, the NGA Center began working to raise awareness among state homeland security directors and advisors of the multi-faceted threat of a pandemic influenza or other widespread disease outbreak. While the initial response to any outbreak will focus on treating the ill and limiting the spread of disease, state officials also must plan for the potential of large-scale worker absenteeism due to illness or dependent-care requirements. They also should be aware that the strategies they employ to limit the spread of disease—closing schools, limiting travel, or canceling public gatherings—can limit governments' ability to provide essential goods and services.

Key Resources

• State Pandemic Influenza Plans
• Pandemicflu.gov
• Pandemic Leadership Forum and Blog
• State and Local Planning Checklist
• CDC: Community Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Mitigation in the United States (Interim Guidance)
• DHS Pandemic Influenza Planning Best Practices and Model Protocols
• FEMA Pandemic Influenza Government Continuity of Operations Planning Guidance
• Congressional Budget Office Pandemic Economic Impact Study
• DHS Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
  
  
• Antiviral Stockpile or Pharmacologic Interventions
  • Panflu.gov – Medications/antivirals
  • HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan Supplement 7 Antiviral Drug Distribution and Use
  • World Health Organization—vaccines and antivirals
  • HHS State Antiviral Allocation Chart
  • State Pandemic Toolkit

Critical Links

• HHS-State Summit Reports
  
  
• HHS Pandemic Preparedness Status Updates:
  • Status Report I
  • Status Report II
  • Status Report III
    
    
• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Emergency Preparedness and Response
• World Health Organization
• World Bank Global Economic Impact Information
• Department of Education
• Department of State
• Department of Agriculture
• Association of State and Territorial Health Officials
• National Association of City and County Health Officials
• American Public Health Association

Additional Information

• UPMC Center for Biosecurity
• University of Minnesota Center for Disease Research and Policy
• Trust for America's Health