State Intelligence Fusion Centers: Recent State Actions

Executive Summary

State intelligence fusion centers—central locations at which local, state and federal officials work in close proximity to receive, integrate and analyze information and intelligence—can be instrumental in improving the quality of intelligence by closing information gaps that previously have hampered counterterrorism efforts at the state and local level. As a result, fusion centers have become a major focus of homeland security programs in several states.

However, because standards for organizational design and operational methods still are emerging (see the earlier NGA Center for Best Practices issue brief “Establishing State Intelligence Fusion Centers”), the form and function of intelligence fusion centers vary from state to state. This issue brief provides a state-by-state overview of the status and structure of state intelligence fusion centers, along with state-reported requirements for additional federal funding. The information included in this issue brief was compiled through a direct survey of state homeland security directors conducted by the NGA Center for Best Practices.

The survey, conducted during late spring and early summer of 2005, identified several common intelligence fusion center operating elements. For example:

- Most centers include staff from multiple agencies at the state, local, and federal levels;
- The centers maintain clear and direct communication channels to field officers and policy makers; and,
- Centers are designed to be multi-purpose, focusing not only on terrorism prevention but also on fighting crime in general.

At the same time, several variations in the structure of intelligence fusion structures also were identified. For example:

- Some centers only have analytical roles while others also have the personnel and capabilities to act on intelligence;
- Some centers have a regional outlook, sharing information among states; others have a vertical structure, connecting states to local and federal agencies, but not to other states; and
- Some centers are contained within the federally led joint terrorism task forces; others are independent.

Introduction

Four years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, state homeland security efforts are shifting from improving response capabilities to preventing terrorist attacks. One critical component identified by state officials in the prevention of attacks is the need to close gaps in the intelligence community through the development and implementation of state intelligence fusion centers (IFC). The IFCs encourage collaboration among local, state and federal officials and across myriad disciplines while integrating homeland security and counterterrorism efforts at all levels of government. A previous issue brief published by the NGA Center for Best Practices (Center), titled “Establishing State Intelligence Fusion
Centers,” outlined key issues challenging states as they form intelligence fusion centers. Those challenges include legal limits and cultural barriers to information sharing; the need for start-up and long-term operational funding; and privacy concerns.

To assess activities at the state level, the Center surveyed the state homeland security directors on the status of their intelligence fusion centers, how those centers are structured, and what assistance the federal government should provide to the states to further develop and integrate state centers into a national “system of systems.” This issue brief provides a state-by-state overview of the status and structure of state intelligence fusion centers, along with reported requirements for additional federal resources.

**Fusion Center Status by State**

**Arizona**

Arizona’s ACTIC is a cross-jurisdictional partnership managed by the Arizona Department of Public Safety and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, integrating state, local, and federal law enforcement, as well as first responders, emergency management and--when appropriate--the private sector. A 24/7 Watch Center is the central location for all information coming into and out of the ACTIC.

The mission of the ACTIC is to protect the citizens and critical infrastructures of Arizona by enhancing intelligence and domestic preparedness operations for all state, local, and federal law enforcement agencies. Mission execution will be guided by the understanding that the key to effectiveness is the development and sharing of information between participants to the fullest extent as is permitted by law or agency policy.

**Driving Forces:** Governor Janet Napolitano’s Arizona Homeland Security Plan

**Build Out Funds:** State Homeland Security Grant--$3.5 million
2004 LETPP--$1.8 million
State Appropriated Funds--$150,000
Federal Agency Funds--$500,000

**Duration to Build:** 1 Year

**Facility Opened:** October 1, 2004--Governor dedicated October 19, 2004

**Location:** North Phoenix with easy multiple freeway access

**Facility Description:** 61,000 square foot block building, three 800kw backup generators and a block fenced parking with security gates & armed guard

**Occupancy Capacity:** 282 workstations

Federal/State/Local Suite 100–157 workstations
FBI/JTTF/FIG Suite 150–125 workstations

**Participating Agencies:**
Special Investigations, U.S. Secret Service, Internal Revenue Service, Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Scottsdale PD and Tempe PD.

**Additional Arizona DPS Occupants:**
- Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) Squad
- HazMat/EOD/WMD Unit
- Computer Forensics Lab
- Criminal Investigations Research Unit–CIRU
- Geographical Information Systems–GIS
- Violent Criminal Apprehension Program--ViCAP

The ACTIC is a component of the Arizona Department of Public Safety, Domestic Preparedness Command. It provides a real-time informational link between state, local, and federal law enforcement and first responder agencies. It functions as a multi-agency, all-crimes effort staffed by members of the Department of Public Safety, other state, local, and federal Agencies. The Center is co-located with the FBI Joint Terrorist Task Force, which will centralize the counter terrorism effort and greatly enhance interagency cooperation and information flow. The ACTIC is responsible for:

- providing tactical and strategic intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination support to state, local, and Federal law enforcement agencies;
- maintaining and disseminating ongoing threat analysis for the state and its critical infrastructure;
- providing informational support to the Governor and other governmental leaders;
- maintaining a secure Web site to disseminate intelligence and critical information accessible to all law enforcement and first responder agencies;
- maintaining the Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (ATIX) secure Web site portal for the dissemination and exchange of information to law enforcement and private and public stakeholder agencies that support homeland security efforts;
- functioning as the State’s central point of dissemination for Homeland Security Threat Level Conditions and other information generated by the FBI, U.S. Attorney’s Office and other state, local, and Federal agencies;
- maintaining a formalized liaison program with private sector stakeholders responsible for critical infrastructures and terrorist incident response within Arizona;
- maintaining a formalized liaison with other governmental agencies to support Arizona’s counter-terrorism efforts;
- providing necessary training on intelligence and the role of the individual field officer and citizen in preventing terrorist attacks;
- maintaining necessary databases to support ongoing investigations;
- incorporating existing database linkages to other law enforcement, government, and private agencies into the overall counter terrorist effort;
- maintaining an intelligence liaison program that provides direct investigative and analytical support to other agencies;
- maintaining a 24/7 contact phone number where citizens can report suspicious activity and agencies can request assistance;
- maintaining a 24/7 research capability to support on going requests from state, local, and federal law enforcement agencies;
- maintaining a central point of contact for coordinating the response to suspected biological incidents;
- maintaining a central point of contact for the deployment of DPS and other state agency assets to support local agencies; and
maintaining a direct liaison with the FBI Joint Terrorist Task Force, U.S. Attorney’s Office Anti-Terrorism Task Force and other state, local, and federal law enforcement agencies on ongoing investigations and items of interest.

Arkansas

Arkansas does not have a state intelligence fusion center. Arkansas has discussed the concept and will ultimately establish an intelligence center. Arkansas has not begun any implementing action to date.

California

The California State Terrorism Threat Assessment Centers (STTAC) is a partnership of the California Department of Justice, the California Highway Patrol, the California Office of Homeland Security (OHS), and other state and federal agencies. The STTAC currently is organized with a Situation Unit, a Group Analysis Unit, and a Predictive Incident Indicators Analysis Unit. Currently, the STTAC provides statewide analysis products, information tracking, pattern analysis, geographic report linkages, and other statewide intelligence products, as well as regional investigative support throughout California.

The plan to detect, deter, and prevent terrorism in California is based on public safety partnerships in information sharing, analysis, and investigation support. These partnerships bring together state, local, and federal law enforcement agencies, and their respective law enforcement, public safety, and criminal information systems. To complement the efforts of the federal government through the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the FBI, California has created four mutually supporting Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Centers, aligned with the four FBI Field Offices in the state, and a State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center. The State Center is designed to provide California’s senior leaders with situational awareness of identified threats, visibility of and coordination with the critical infrastructure of the state, and constant access to the latest local, state and national intelligence products and assessments.

At the local level, law enforcement and public safety agencies designate Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLO) who are trained in the review and assessment of local reporting and in conducting outreach to other public safety agencies, critical infrastructure operators, and community groups. The TLO is the local agency point of contact for all terrorism related alerts, requests for information, warnings and other notifications from state, regional or federal homeland security agencies. The TLO will review local agency reports, manage local reporting, and initiate or respond to requests for information. The TLO will have an ongoing relationship with other local agencies, especially those with daily contact in the community, and will develop relationships with critical infrastructure sites within their respective jurisdictions. Through a single Web-based state terrorism Web site the TLO and his agency will have access to all available terrorism alerts, notices, information, and documents with searchable databases.

There are four Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Centers (RTTACs). Their areas of responsibility mirror those of the four FBI field offices in California, minimizing reporting conflicts, providing statewide coverage, and facilitating coordination with the FBI. The RTTACs will either be physically co-located with the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) or will have close working relationships. The RTTACs and JTTFs will have mutual information exchanges, will share a common communications system, and have state and local investigative resources that can be available to the JTTFs. The RTTACs will develop a regional threat assessment intelligence picture, will have analytical functions, and will connect directly to each other and share information and produce intelligence reports and other products.
They will use both raw data and analysis products from local agencies and will have ongoing collaboration the State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center.

The STTAC also has extensive Geographic Information System (GIS) data on the state’s critical infrastructure and potential vulnerabilities linked to incident reporting by local agencies and the RTTACs to provide a Predictive Indicators Database for our critical infrastructure sites and provide assessments on industry vulnerabilities.

The STTAC monitors current law enforcement operations, conducts known terrorist group analysis, and monitors and supports national reporting and collection systems. The STTAC will provide 24/7 situational awareness for OHS and the state leadership, and has direct linkage to the National Counter Terrorism Center and their National Watch List through the Homeland Security Operations Center.

The STTAC shortly will open a single Web-based terrorism-information portal for law enforcement and public safety agencies statewide. Through this site, every eligible TLO and senior public safety official can gain direct access to the entire range of law enforcement sensitive Homeland Security alerts, reports, analysis, and daily reporting. Further, this single site will provide a common point of entry for field reports, tips, alerts, and requests for information.

The pool of information developed by California’s state, local, and regional agencies will be available to ongoing state and federal investigations and for analysis by both FBI and Homeland Security analysts to support their ongoing national and international investigations and assessments. The California system fully complements and serves the needs of both the FBI and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, providing access to information from the local police officer to national analyst and investigator, sharing access to information, and sharing relevant products to ensure better safety for our state and nation.

**Connecticut**

Connecticut is in the process of working with the Municipal Police Chiefs, the State Police, State Office of Emergency Management and Homeland Security, and the local office of the FBI to explore the possibility of a Fusion/Intelligence center.

**Delaware**

Delaware is in the process of developing a Fusion Center. Delaware currently has plans for a site being developed and is working on personnel and infrastructure programs to support the planning process. Expectations are that the IFC will be operational, on a limited basis, within six months.

**Georgia**

Georgia has a state-level agency dedicated solely to homeland security, anti-terrorism, and counter-terrorism operations (GISAC). GISAC’s mission is to enhance and facilitate the collection of intelligence information from local, state, and federal sources, and to integrate that intelligence information into a system that will benefit homeland security and counter-terrorism programs.

The Georgia General Assembly legislated the GISAC mission through the Antiterrorism Act (OCGA 35-3-60), to “assist law enforcement personnel to identify, investigate, arrest, and prosecute individuals or groups of individuals who illegally threaten, harass, terrorize, or otherwise injure or damage the person or
property of persons on the basis of their race, national origin, or religious persuasion,” and to establish “a special Antiterrorism Task Force within the Georgia Bureau of Investigation;” Antiterroristic Training Act (OCGA 16-11-150), makes it unlawful for a person to:
1) teach, train, or demonstrate to any other person the use, application, or making of any illegal firearm, dangerous weapon, explosive, or incendiary device capable of causing injury or death to persons either directly, or through a writing, or over or through the computer, or compute network, if the person teaching, training, or demonstrating will be unlawfully employed for use in, or in furtherance of, a civil disorder, riot, or insurrection; or
2) assemble with one or more persons for the purpose of being taught, trained, or instructed in the use of any illegal firearm, dangerous weapon, explosive, or incendiary device capable of causing injury or death of persons, if such person so assembling knows, has reason to know, or intends that such teaching, training, or instruction will be unlawfully employed for use in or in furtherance of a civil disorder, riot, or insurrection;” and Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) Investigative Division Directive 8-8-18.

This series of legislation gives GISAC the primary responsibility for developing and evaluating information about persons and/or organizations engaged in terrorist activities, investigating terrorist activities, and making liaisons with GBI work-units and other law enforcement agencies engaged in antiterrorism and counter-terrorism operations and investigations.

State agencies and organizations that directly participate in GISAC are: Georgia Office of Homeland Security (GOHS); Georgia Homeland Security Task Force (GHSTF); Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI); Georgia State Police (GSP); Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA); Georgia Department of Defense/Georgia National Guard (GANG); Georgia Sheriff’s Association (GSA); and Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police (GACP)

GISAC not only incorporates state and local assets but federal agencies participate in GISAC as Homeland Security Partners. These agencies are: US Department of Homeland Security (DHS); Atlanta office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the Atlanta Joint Terrorism Task Force.

Staffing for GISAC is a multi-agency approach. GISAC has 18 persons employed on day-to-day operations. The staff breakdown is: Georgia Bureau of Investigation provides: (1) Inspectors, (1) Special Agents in Charge, (1) Assistant Special Agents in Charge, (2) Intelligence Analysts, and (7) Special Agents. Georgia State Patrol provides (1) Investigator/Analyst. The Georgia Emergency Management Agency provides (2) Critical Infrastructure Analysts. Georgia National Guard provides (1) Intelligence Analyst. Georgia Sheriff’s Association provides (1) Investigator/Agent. Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police provides (1) Investigator/Agent.

GISAC duties and responsibilities are categorized by the following: 1) collection, analysis, and sharing of terrorism intelligence information; 2) terrorist threat assessment and monitoring; 3) terrorist incident response; and 4) development and implementation of special project, strategies, and initiatives.

The primary function of GISAC is to collect, integrate, investigate, evaluate, and share information pertaining to possible terrorist activities in Georgia. As information is received at GISAC, it is initially documented by GISAC investigators and analysts, and then immediately evaluated by GBI supervisors, who filter, classify, disseminate, and when appropriate, conduct follow-up investigation and analysis. After review, the “raw” information is forwarded to GISAC’s GEMA, GANG, GSA, and GACP representatives, who review it within the context of their own particular areas of interest and responsibility. Those representatives subsequently may recommend certain actions to GISAC supervisors.
and/or their own agency/organization managers in order to disrupt or prevent possible terrorist attacks, or to mitigate and manage the consequences of an attack.

**Hawai‘i**

Hawai‘i does not have a fully operational fusion center but needs to establish an IFC. This work is currently performed by the FBI/JTTF in Honolulu. The goal is to establish a 24/7 capability in the State EOC that will contribute to intelligence fusion. This capability also will provide early warning for natural hazards. Hawai‘i has submitted a funding request to the state legislature to authorize eight new positions for the State Civil Defense Division. These positions coupled with a reorganization and subsequent assignment of other staff positions will provide the core 24/7 capability of Hawaii’s IFC.

**Illinois**

The Illinois State Police Statewide Terrorism & Intelligence Center (STIC), consists of several units specializing in narcotics, violent crimes, sex offender registration, motor vehicle theft clearinghouse, and Terrorism Research. STIC became operational 24/7 on April 7, 2003, with the primary focus on terrorism. On September 1, 2004, STIC became a fusion center shifting the focus from strictly responding to terrorism-related requests, to providing assistance for all investigations.

Currently, STIC is staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week with 12 (18 are needed) Terrorism Research Analysts (TRRs) and four Watch Officers. The Terrorism Research Analysts are contractual employees, while the Watch Officers are sworn full-time Illinois State Police Officers. In addition, there is one full-time civilian employee (Terrorism Coordinator) who coordinates activity for all three shifts. The Command staff is comprised of one Lieutenant and two Master Sergeants.

The remaining units falling under STIC work a normal day shift and are staffed with primarily full-time Illinois State Police civilian employees. Below is a breakdown of those employees by function.

- Narcotics: one Narcotics Coordinator, three Intelligence Analysts (National Guard)
- Violent Crimes: one Violent Crimes Coordinator, three Intelligence Analysts (full-time state employees)
- Motor Vehicle Theft: one Motor Vehicle Theft Coordinator, two Intelligence Analysts (full-time state employees)
- Sex Offender Registration: one Sex Offender Registration Coordinator, two Intelligence Analysts (full-time state employees)
- Support staff

The coordinators from each unit and representatives from the Command staff comprise a special group referred to as the TIG, Threat Integration Group. The TIG meets daily to review, analyze, and give direction concerning the activity reported during the previous 24 hours. The TIG is an essential tool for providing meaningful information to field officers and decision makers. Senior members of TIG may be called to meet at anytime should an incident or circumstances dictate.

**Indiana**

Indiana is in the process of starting an intelligence fusion center. The focus will be an all crimes 24/7 operation. Indiana is trying to get this started through a task force concept involving the Indiana State Police, Indianapolis Police Department, and the Marion County Sheriff’s Department. The Indiana State
Council on Counter Terrorism has made the intelligence center a high priority in state government. Indiana’s Governor has introduced legislation to implement a new state agency, the state Homeland Security Department. Once the new agency has been established, the effort to start the intelligence center will pick up momentum.

Indiana has been given $850,000 of 2004 DHS grant money that had been earmarked for this project. Indiana is in the process of securing additional grant funding through the 2005 DHS grant for homeland security. The goal is to have an operational IFC by the end of 2005.

**Iowa**

The State of Iowa is developing an intelligence fusion center using the Iowa Law Enforcement Intelligence Network (LEIN) as the "backbone." Eight personnel in the Iowa Department of Public Safety have been reassigned to these intelligence duties, and their efforts are being leveraged with existing personnel of the DPS Intelligence Bureau. Additional employees, especially analysts, are still needed. Iowa also is in the process of identifying a physical location and purchasing equipment to support the personnel.

**Louisiana**

Louisiana is in the implementation stage of their fusion center. Sixty percent is complete.

**Maryland**

The Maryland ATAC Coordination and Analysis Center (MCAC) was established for the analysis and dissemination of information in statewide support of law enforcement, public health and welfare, public safety, and homeland security.

The primary function of the MCAC is to provide analytical support for all state, local, and federal agencies involved in law enforcement, public health and welfare, public safety, and homeland security in Maryland. It is meant to provide strategic analysis to focus investigative activities being conducted by law enforcement agencies within the state and to enable public health and safety agencies to perform their protective functions. By design, the Center is not an investigative body, but is meant to address a serious analytical deficiency in the state. In addition, the Center, through its Watch Section, enables public and private entities within Maryland to receive and disseminate critical information to other similar entities established by other states, as well as with any national centers created by the federal government, such as the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), and CT Watch.

The Executive Committee of the Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) of Maryland has selected from the ATAC membership a director and two assistant directors of the MCAC. A captain of the Baltimore County Police Department is the Center’s director. A lieutenant of the Maryland Transportation Authority Police is an assistant director and supervises the Watch Section. A supervisory special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is an assistant director and supervises the Strategic Analysis Section. The IT Support Section is supervised by an employee hired by the ATAC Executive Committee and reports to the MCAC Director. While the ATAC Executive Committee is the policy making body, relying heavily upon input from the general membership of the ATAC, the day-to-day operation of the MCAC is the responsibility of the assigned director and assistant directors. The MCAC management reports, and is responsible, to the ATAC Coordinator.
The Center is not intended to supplant the numerous investigative bodies now in force within Maryland, such as ICE’s Technology Transfer Task Force, the various HIDTA investigative groups, the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), etc., but to act in support of these bodies, enabling them to be more effective and focused in their important tasks.

Center staff consists of assigned personnel from state, local, and/or federal agencies with homeland security, public safety, public health, and/or law enforcement responsibilities. It is intended that the Center be as inclusive as possible in order to promote efficiency in its critical functions and to achieve the desired synergistic effect.

**Michigan**

Michigan has discussed the feasibility of opening a Fusion Center. Plans have not proceeded beyond the discussion phase.

**Minnesota**

Minnesota is forming an intelligence center in conjunction with state, local, and federal partners. This center will be co-located in one facility. Currently, Indiana has deployed a Web site to facilitate collection of information and dissemination of intelligence over a three-state area. This Web site is utilized by Minnesota law enforcement and other public and private partners.

**Mississippi**

Mississippi does not have a fully operational Intel Fusion Center. Mississippi is in the process of developing a plan for such a center. Talks have been conducted with the National Guard, FBI, Highway Patrol, Public Health, and Mississippi Emergency Management, etc. All are in agreement, and Mississippi is planning to co-locate the center with the new Emergency Operations Center in Jackson.

**Missouri**

Missouri does not have an Intelligence Fusion Center. The Missouri State Highway Patrol does man an Intelligence Center but it only deals with state-centered activity and doesn't bring all of the local and federal agencies together to combine the analysis and interpretation of the information that they could share. The state does participate in two ATACs (St. Louis and Kansas City). Further development of a Fusion Center will depend on the direction officials receive from the new administration.

**Montana**

The Montana All Threat Intelligence Center (MATIC) has been in operation since the fall of 2004. MATIC is co-located with the Montana JTTF. The Center has one supervisory agent (State) and six analysts. The Center acts as a collection/dissemination point for information between state, local, and federal agencies. The MATIC is currently limited in adding more participating members because of space limitations.
Nebraska

Nebraska does not have a Fusion Center but has had discussions with the Nebraska State Patrol and the National Guard. Nebraska has not gone beyond the discussion point.

North Dakota

The North Dakota Homeland Security Fusion Center consists of four personnel from the following agencies; the Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BCI), the Highway Patrol (HP), the National Guard (NG), and the Division of Emergency Management (DEM). The Bureau of Criminal Investigation is the lead agency. The IFC has three primary functions; intelligence, investigation, and operations. The IFC provides one central location for the investigation, intelligence collection, and dissemination of North Dakota homeland security information. The IFC analyzes relevant information to determine any homeland security threats, vulnerabilities, or concerns. The IFC is operational and provides intelligence information to our state, local, federal, and private partners. North Dakota is in the process of redefining policies and operational procedures.

Ohio

Ohio’s center, the Strategic Analysis and Information Center (SAIC), has been in limited operation since January 25, 2005. The SAIC is a branch of the Ohio Homeland Security Division, under the Ohio Department of Public Safety. Ohio’s SAIC is operating currently with a core group of agencies: the Ohio State Highway Patrol, the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation, the Ohio National Guard, the Ohio Emergency Management Agency, and Ohio Homeland Security personnel. As the SAIC builds in the next several months, it will add agencies such as local and county law enforcement, Ohio Departments of Health, Agriculture, Environmental Protection, Rehabilitation and Corrections, Transportation, and Justice Services.

South Carolina

South Carolina is in the process of creating Intel Fusion Center.

South Dakota

South Dakota does not have an Intelligence Fusion Center. South Dakota has discussed the possibility of implementing an Intelligence Fusion Center but has not yet taken any action. South Dakota is working with Minnesota to view the intelligence gathered by their Center. Minnesota’s intelligence is regional in nature and has given South Dakota insight into what is happening in this area of the United States.

Vermont

Vermont does not have an active Fusion Center but will be starting one. Currently, Vermont has a traditional criminal intelligence unit within the State Police. Vermont recognizes the importance of a Fusion Center for several years and it has been a long term goal. Vermont is in negotiations with a federal partner to establish a Fusion Center. The center model would be the Upstate New York Regional Intelligence Center. Upon approval, Vermont will move their intelligence unit to this center. The Vermont State Police Criminal Intelligence Unit would be the nucleus of the Fusion Center and other intelligence partners will be invited to join. Each unit that joins would maintain their current responsibilities to their respective agencies but would be part of a larger information sharing team.
**Washington**

Washington State has an operational fusion center (intel center) termed the Washington Joint Analytical Center (WAJAC). This statewide integrated intelligence center is co-located with the FBI analytical center and includes state and local law enforcement. It will expand to regional centers in the near future. Additional partners from other than law enforcement are under consideration. This is an outstanding example of law enforcement in the state collaborating on a fusion center as state and local shares of federal grant funds are being jointly managed to stand up and operate the center.

Washington State will be adding contract analysts to the Washington Joint Analytical Center soon, which will expand the capabilities of the center. The state's original plan was to use commissioned law enforcement personnel; however, current ODP grants do not allow for the hiring of commissioned law enforcement personnel and restrict analyst hiring to contractors only.

**What type of resources do the states need from the federal government to complete development or improve their centers (e.g. funding, access to certain information, expertise, training, etc.)?**

**Arizona**

- Some method of sustainment funding that would ensure the continued operation of the state center. Realizing that the states must be a partner this could be a shared responsibility with funding coming from the federal system with the states providing either direct funding or more importantly in-kind funding in the form of personnel costs.
- Allowing the states to hire full time analyst FTE's. This is a critical component of any center. While the 2005 SHSG allows the hiring of contract analysts, it would be much more efficient if the analyst were hired as members of the respective agency. This would enhance recruitment efforts. The program could follow the COPS model, with funding stopping after a designated period of time and then the states would pick up the costs.
- Removing some of the restrictions on the use of SHSG funds to allow the state to apply the funds where the intelligence center can best use them. This would include costs of phone and utility service. Specific overtime and travel for personnel assigned to the center.
- A commitment from the federal government to provide staffing to support the state centers. This support could come in the way of analytical and technical services.
- A larger commitment by the federal government and the SHSG program to the prevention effort. Prevention is the key to counter-terrorist operations and there needs to be more emphasis in this area. Expand the amount of funding available under the LETPP and keep this program separate from the general SHSG program in order to concentrate this effort on law enforcement.

**Arkansas**

- Training for analysts.
- Sharing of expertise from other states.

**California**

- The accelerated fielding of the JRIES-SECRET system to allow for information sharing at the classified level between our RTTACS and their counterpart JTTFs.
- Giving policy discretion for personnel costs associated with intelligence analysts and fusion center staffing.
• Standardizing training that mirrors or includes both specific analyst skills and management of analytical process and products, and integration of state and local intelligence personnel into the FBI training courses to ensure compatibility of training and operations.
• Conduct a national forum for best practices, lessons learned, key skill development and networking.

Connecticut
• Funding for training in the area of analyzing the information.
• Securing the proper equipment.

Delaware
• Increasing funding to start up an IFC.
• Assistance in purchasing necessary equipment (computers, teleconferencing capabilities, etc.).
• Funding to support civilian analyst.
• Training opportunities for these analyst and supervisors.
• Connectivity to certain databases and information available to the law enforcement community currently housed with many of the federal agencies.

Hawai’i
• Funding for additional staffing (not through contract).
• Equipment (i.e., computers and communications equipment).
• Additional allocations for security clearances.

Illinois
• The largest challenge facing the STIC today remains continued funding to pay salaries and benefits to the contractual employees, approximately $950,000.00 annually. Not only is ISP concerned about the funding, but also by the limitations imposed upon the funding. Current rules governing federal funds will not allow paying for full-time employees, and labor issues within the state are forcing to the reduction of or elimination of contractual employees from the work force. In addition, it is difficult to train and keep contractual help since they are not being provided full-time benefits such as health care, life insurance, holidays, vacations, and retirement.
• Analysts need the same training provided by the FBI, expertise in developing threat assessments, sharing of information at all levels and streamlining the flow of the information.

Indiana
• Funding from the federal government will continue to be a priority need. This includes start up funding and a commitment to long range funding.
• Some defined best practices models would be helpful. Some centers are only terrorism focused, some are all crime. Some centers are closely aligned with the FBI JTTF’s and some are not. Some have been closely aligned with the FBI JTTF’s and are now changing that format.
• Access to FBI (all federal agencies) intelligence information is in need of improvement.
• There is still a lot of room for improvement in the relationship between local agencies and the FBI.
• Various training opportunities exist, but literature points out that some or most may be in need of improvement to ensure it provides analysts with the necessary skill sets.

Iowa
Funding for personnel that are assigned specifically to intelligence and information sharing activities is the most critical need. The character of U.S. law enforcement agencies is such that existing personnel typically are dedicated to response activities. Funding for intelligence and information sharing personnel could be implemented in a manner similar to the approach used for the COPS funding for hiring law enforcement personnel (where the funding for personnel is borne eventually by the agency).

Improved coordination among federal agencies, and between federal and state and local agencies. Leveraging and coordination of existing resources will help states and localities. This coordination can be done by increasing communication and interaction among such entities as the Homeland Security Advisory Committee, the U.S. DOJ Intelligence Coordinating Council and the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council.

Support for standards for configuring and operating fusion centers. These standards already are being developed by jurisdictions that are configuring and operating fusion centers. As these centers are "stood up," they will necessarily need to interact with one another. Standards will facilitate this interaction and connectivity. The federal government should support these standards.

**Louisiana**

- Technical advisors—advice from subject matter experts who can assist in informing the states of proven methods or even failures that have occurred in standing up fusion centers in other places.
- Information—specifically, allowing the states to have a constant input of "timely" risk assessment information. Additionally, with the reorganization of responsibilities as well as the formation of new information centers, states may be unaware of regional operations that have value added fit, such as intelligence information products that may be beneficial to multiple states and the communities they serve.
- Training— in the area of intelligence analysis (especially that which takes us past basic techniques) into areas of collection planning, bias identification, critical thinking, etc. does not meet a set standard. State analysts may not be working with the same common operating picture that effects the intelligence cycle.
- Personnel—assistance from sources that could provide assistance in staffing the fusion center in the role of intelligence analysts or information specialists.

**Maryland**

- Funding directed towards fusion centers.
- Allowable costs should be reviewed by a task group of states to make recommendations based on the reality of these centers.

**Michigan**

- Commitment from federal and local agencies to co-locate personnel with our intelligence section (and their funding commitments).
- Operating from a facility that would house all personnel together

**Minnesota**

- Active communication with other state and locals on what is being developed and/or coordinating of how centers can be developed nationwide with national initiatives.
- Federal funding for developing coordinated regional approaches.

**Mississippi**
o Funding—Mississippi planned to hire an intelligence director; however, federal '05 funding was cut by about $10 million, and the state cut the Department of Public Safety budget by about $5 million.

Missouri
- Technical Assistance to help the state move the process forward.
- Clarification of ODP's position on the Intelligence Analyst positions.
- Training.

Montana
- Funding to secure a location that will accommodate operations and allow for future growth.

Nebraska
- Funding to begin, maintain, and sustain an IFC.

North Dakota
- Funding for personnel, training and equipment.
- DHS sponsored training for INTEL analysts.
- An INTEL flowchart and/or guidance that describes how State Fusion Centers are incorporated into the Homeland Security INTEL community.
- Training in critical infrastructure assessments.
- Training in response to an incident.

Ohio
- Funding to purchase analytical software and an operating system.
- Training in 28 CFR Part 23 and analytical training.
- GIS capabilities must be updated and expanded.
- “Fusion center” minimum standards.

South Carolina
- Access to certain information.
- Analyst training.
- Funding for more analysts.
- Guidance from DHS in how they want us to develop the IFC.

South Dakota
- Access to as much intelligence as possible.
- Promote the sharing of intelligence between states. Promoting the sharing of intelligence should be supported from the top down to the local officials on the street. This sharing of intelligence/information with officials who have the responsibility for the protection of people and critical resources is vitally important. The more access the states have to intelligence, the better we will see trends in terrorism.
- Review of the classification process. One thing that inhibits the sharing of intelligence is when it gets classified. Agencies that have the authority to classify intelligence should analyze their intelligence carefully to make sure it warrants being classified.

Vermont
Federal recognition that state IFCs are the single point of contact for information sharing with the states. This recognition will further help identify the State's role in protecting the country from another attack.

Funding.

*Washington*

The authority for use of ODP grant funds for contract analysts has provided some relief. Contract analysts, however, must be hired under "contract," and there is significant command/control, assignment of duties, and IRS issues associated with contractors vs. FTEs. The best course of action is to have the ability to use federal grant funds for law enforcement personnel participation.